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K-Hub PCVE Outlook #4

Digital Communication Strategies to Counter Radical Ideologies

Exploring the Digital Communication Strategies of Civil Society Organisations in Indonesia to Prevent and Address Violent Extremism

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Introduction

Online radicalisation has become a serious global threat. Radicalisation is no longer only limited to collective action offline, which typically begins with individuals joining a terror group, but also includes connective action, where an individual is exposed to radicalism online by connecting with similar ideas. In Indonesia, for instance, a 19-year-old youth identified as HOK was influenced to join a radical network abroad through the Telegram social media platform. He joined several Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) channels, such as Radical Alem and Amaq News. This influenced him to construct homemade bombs at his residence in Batu, Malang (24/08).1

Based on data from the Ministry of Communication and Informatics (Kemenkominfo), between 7 July 2023 and 21 March 2024, they have addressed 5,731 pieces of digital content related to radicalism, extremism, and terrorism. Meta was reported as the most commonly used platform for spreading such content.2 According to Kompas, the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) also identified 2,264 social media accounts containing 10,519 pieces of content linked to intolerance, radicalism, extremism, and terrorism from January 2024 to 29 October 2024. Among these thousands of accounts, 1,013 were Facebook accounts, 571 were WhatsApp accounts, 185 were Telegram accounts, 163 were Instagram accounts, 145 were online media accounts, 129 were X (formerly Twitter) accounts, 36 were TikTok accounts, and 22 were YouTube accounts.

Furthermore, Kompas detailed that the content shared by these accounts included 29 pieces of content related to hiding, 430 on carrying out terrorist attacks, 107 on recruitment, 7 on paramilitary activities, 54 on training, 36 on planning, 201 on funding, 15 on providing logistics, and 9,640 on propaganda. Specifically regarding propaganda, there were 8,694 pieces of general content, 512 anti-Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) content, 77 anti-Pancasila content, 147 intolerant content pieces, and 210 "takfiri" content — a doctrine that teaches accusing or condemning someone as an unbeliever.3

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Landscape

From June to July 2024, the K-Hub PVE Community and KPP conducted research on the digital communication strategies of thirty-five (35) Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the field of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) through desk reviews, surveys, and focus group discussions (FGDs). This research aimed to map best practices, challenges, communication strategy gaps, as well as opportunities and projections for the development of PCVE CSOs' digital communication strategies in the future.

Key Findings

1.

9 out of every 10 CSOs in Indonesia adopt a Positive Alternative approach in their digital communication strategies.

2.

8 out of every 10 CSOs do not have a specific digital communication strategy roadmap.

3.

4 out of every 10 CSOs lack a dedicated communication strategy division. Moreover, 2 out of every 35 organisations do not implement any specific communication strategy at all.

4.

Communication strategy development and content management present the biggest challenges for CSOs. This includes difficulties in managing relevant content, responding to issues, maintaining consistency in communication strategies, and measuring content impact.

The organisations studied employed diverse approaches. Referring to the PCVE Communication Approach Quadrant by Tio and Kruber (2022), these approaches can be classified into four quadrants.

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One-Way MessageTwo-Way Dialogue
Proactive ResilienceReactive Mitigation
Regional
Community
Individual

Best Practices in Digital Communication Strategy

Based on research, several best practices have been identified in the digital communication strategies of CSOs focused on preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE).

Image of Key Opinion Leader

Key figures, commonly referred to as Key Opinion Leader (KOL), play a major role in effectively conveying messages to prevent violent extremism in a personal, relatable, and authentic manner. Moreover, KOLs who have firsthand experience with radicalism will convey more impactful messages.

The Wahid Foundation exemplifies this best practice by positioning Yenny Wahid as the face of the organisation and a key figure in spreading its messages, both nationally and internationally. Through Wahid Foundation's social media, Yenny Wahid and her communication team use personal and human-centred narratives to promote interfaith dialogue and respond to current issues. She also deeply understands the Wahid Foundation's audience’s interests, which allows her to create personal narratives that resonate with them. For example, she connects the foundation's messages to relevant values taught by Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur).

Similarly, Yayasan Debintal demonstrates best practices by involving Hendro Fernando, a former ISIS member, as a KOL. Leveraging his insights into terrorist networks, Hendro plays a key role in building counter-radicalism narratives on social media, responding to emerging issues within terror groups. He is also a central figure in Yayasan Debintal's media platforms, where he shares their peace-building activities, such as the Safari Dakwah program, which involves visiting former extremists in prisons across Indonesia—strengthening the audience's trust.

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Key Figures Relevant to the Audience

Image of Key Opinion LeaderImage of Comics as an Alternative MediumImage of Effective Communication FrameworkImage of Utilising Various Digital ChannelsImage of Periodic Capacity Building

Key figures, commonly referred to as Key Opinion Leader (KOL), play a major role in effectively conveying messages to prevent violent extremism in a personal, relatable, and authentic manner. Moreover, KOLs who have firsthand experience with radicalism will convey more impactful messages.

The Wahid Foundation exemplifies this best practice by positioning Yenny Wahid as the face of the organisation and a key figure in spreading its messages, both nationally and internationally. Through Wahid Foundation's social media, Yenny Wahid and her communication team use personal and human-centred narratives to promote interfaith dialogue and respond to current issues. She also deeply understands the Wahid Foundation's audience’s interests, which allows her to create personal narratives that resonate with them. For example, she connects the foundation's messages to relevant values taught by Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur).

Similarly, Yayasan Debintal demonstrates best practices by involving Hendro Fernando, a former ISIS member, as a KOL. Leveraging his insights into terrorist networks, Hendro plays a key role in building counter-radicalism narratives on social media, responding to emerging issues within terror groups. He is also a central figure in Yayasan Debintal's media platforms, where he shares their peace-building activities, such as the Safari Dakwah program, which involves visiting former extremists in prisons across Indonesia—strengthening the audience's trust.

Digital Communication Strategy Challenges

PCVE CSOs in Indonesia face various challenges in planning, developing, and implementing digital communication strategies within their respective organisations. These challenges include:

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*Note: Each organisation may face more than one challenge.

Gaps in Digital Communication Strategies

Challenges in the digital communication strategies of PCVE CSOs are also reflected in the gaps in resources and mechanisms for developing communication strategies within each organisation. Some of these gaps include gaps in the communication strategy division, guidelines and roadmaps, monitoring and evaluation, capacity development, and policies related to GEDSI.

Left cable illustrating gaps in communication strategiesRight cable illustrating gaps in communication strategies

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Opportunities and Projections for Digital Communication

Despite the various challenges and gaps in implementing communication strategies at each PCVE CSO, there are numerous opportunities that can be leveraged by both CSOs and development partners. Some of these opportunities include:

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Citation

Here is the list translated into British English:

[1] Narda, Rachel Catherine, and Dani Prabowo. (August 2024). *Five Facts About the Arrest of a Teenage Terrorist in Batu*.
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/08/06/08433671/5-fakta-penangkapan-teroris-remaja-di-batu
[2] Rochman, Fathur. (March 2024). *Ministry of Communication and Informatics Handles 5,731 Pieces of Content Related to Radicalism in Digital Spaces*.
https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4024440/kemenkominfo-tangani-5731-konten-terkait-radikalisme-di-ruang-digital
[3] Medi, Willy Christian Nababan. (October 2024). *Throughout 2024, 2,264 Social Media Accounts Spread Terrorism-Related Content*.
https://www.kompas.id/artikel/sepanjang-2024-ada-2264-akun-medsos-dan-10519-konten-berbau-terorisme
[4] Editorial Team. (March 2021). *Shooting at Police Headquarters: 'Suspected ISIS Ideologist,' Police Reveal Identity of 25-Year-Old Female Attacker*.
https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-56579674
[5] Presidential Regulation Number 7 of 2021 on the National Action Plan for the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism 2020-2024.
[6] United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2017. *United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Res 2395* (28th December 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2395.
[7] Tio and Kruber. (2022). *Online P/CVE Social Media Efforts*. *Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Indonesia: Islam, Gender, and Civil Society*, Chapter 11: 233-254.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2032-4

Program

  • K-Hub PVE Community
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Outlook is a compilation of research findings, recommendations, and projections of trends in the field of preventing and countering violent extremism. This compilation has been prepared by the PeaceGeneration Indonesia team in collaboration with researchers and partner organisations of K-Hub.

The Outlook page has been developed with the support of the Australian Government through the Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice 2 (AIPJ2).

The views and opinions expressed on this page are those of the compiling team and contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Australian Government and AIPJ2.

AIPJ2 and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) accept no legal responsibility for the material presented on this page.